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iii.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See also Utah Code Ann, 78-2a-3(2)(e), conferring
jurisdiction on this Court.
The Judgment and Order of Probation were signed by the Honorable Lyle
Anderson on April 8th, 2003 and entered by the Clerk of the Court on April 8th,
2003. Sentencing was on April 7th, 2003. The Notice of Appeal was filed on
April 25th, 2003, within 30 days of the entry of judgment. The Appeal is therefore
timely pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal are as follows:
I.

Did the trial court err in overruling the objections by defense counsel
to

Officer

Adair's

testimony

regarding

the

amount

of

methamphetamine in a single dose?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A requirement that the moving party show the
other party has failed to furnish discovery as required by Rule 16, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
State v. Larson, 775 P. 2d 415,418 (Utah 1989),
II.

Did the trial court err determining that Officer Adair was an expert
in the area of methamphetamine distribution and paraphernalia?
U.S. v. Muldrow, 19 F. 3d 1332, 1338 (CA 10(KAN.) 1994).
1

III.

Was the evidence sufficient to find Defendant guilty of Possession
with Intent to Distribute?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Whether reasonable minds must have

ascertained a reasonable doubt.

"The Appellate Court must review all

evidence and inferences in light most favorable to the conviction. Reversal
is appropriate only when evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt."
State v. Brown, 948 P. 2d 337, (Utah 1997).
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Amendment Five of the Constitution of the United States provides, in
relevant part, that:
No person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.
Amendment Six of the Constitution of the United States provides, in
relevant part, that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defense.
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Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States provides, in
relevant part, that:
No State shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of law.
Utah Code Section 76-l-501(l)(2)(a)(b) provides, in relevant part, that:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the
definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
Utah Code Section 77-17-13(l)(a)(b)(2)(a)(b) provides, in relevant part,
that:
(1)
(a)
If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to
testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party
as soon as practicable but not less that 30 days before trial or ten days
before the hearing.
(b)
Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the
expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(2)
(a)
The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the
proposed testimony.
(b)
If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's testimony
including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that opinion, the party
intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing party a written
explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient to give the
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony followed
by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when available.
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16. Discovery, provides, in relevant
part, that:
(a)
Except as otherwise provided the prosecutor shall disclose to
the defense upon request the following materials or information of
which he has knowledge:
(5)
any other item of evidence which the court determines
on good cause shown should be made available to the
defendant on order for the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense.
(b)
The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as
practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant
is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make
disclosure.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay
witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 702. Testimony be experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE.
Ms. Althoff appeals her conviction following a jury trial of Possession of a
Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, in violation of Section 58-37-
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8(l)(a)(iii), a Second Degree Felony; Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol
and/or Drugs, in violation of Section 41-6-44.6 a Class B Misdemeanor;
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of Section 58-37a-5(l) a Class B
Misdemeanor; Driving in Suspended or Revoked Operators License, in violation
of Section 53-3-227(1) a Class B Misdemeanor; and Failure of New Owner to
Secure New Registration and New Certificate of Title, in violation of Section 41la-703 a Class C Misdemeanor.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
Ms. Althoff was charged in a five count Information filed on September
26th, 2002. After a Preliminary Hearing on December 2nd, 2002 she was bound
over on all five charges. At Preliminary Hearing Count 2 was amended to Driving
With a Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body, in violation of Section 41-644.6 U.C.A.
After a Suppression Hearing challenging the legality of the search of her
vehicle was held on February 7th, 2003. Defendant was tried together with her CoDefendant Kevin Rothisberger at a 2-day jury trial February 11-12, 2003, Both
were convicted.
Mr. Rothisberger has appealed his conviction as well, case number
20030494-C A in the Utah Court of Appeals.
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW,
At sentencing on April 7th, 2003 the Honorable Lyle Anderson, Judge,
ordered Ms. Althoff to serve a term in the Utah State Prison for a term of one to
5

fifteen years on Count One; six months in the San Juan County Jail, on Counts 2,
3, and 4 and ninety days in the San Juan County Jail on count 5, to be served
concurrently.
D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS,

On September 24 2002 the Defendant Tonya Althoff was driving her
vehicle in the City of Monticello. She was the driver of the vehicle (TR-50). She
was with Kevin Rothisberger who was in the front passenger seat of her vehicle
(TR-50). Officer James Eberling of the Monticello Police Department stopped the
vehicle for improper lane travel at approximately 350 North Main by the Shake
Shak (TR-50). While Officer Eberling had a conversation with Ms. Althoff he had
dispatch run a check on her drivers license and the car registration. Ms. Althoff
advised Officer Eberling that the reason she crossed the line was because she was
so tired (TR-50-1).
Apparently ascertaining that Ms. Althoff was not impaired by alcohol or
drugs and believing

the reason for the traffic violation was fatigue. Officer

Eberling released Ms. Althoff (TR-51). Shortly thereafter dispatch advised him
that Ms. Althoff s drivers license was suspended and that the vehicle registration
was invalid (TR-51).

Officer Eberling had observed Ms. Althoff pull into a

nearby store and he went there to reestablish contact with her (TR-52). Upon
inquiring about the vehicle registration she informed him she had just purchased
the vehicle from a friend in Moab (TR- 52). Officer Eberling advised her she was
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under arrest (TR-53), and placed her in his car. As her passenger exited the
vehicle he saw a baggie of what he believed was methamphetamme on the vehicle
console (TR-53). The baggie was in plain view but Officer Eberling had not seen
it previously (TR-73).
At some point Officer Eberling had the vehicle moved across the street to
the lot of an abandoned Conoco station (TR-55). At some point he was assisted by
Officer Kent Adair of the Monticello Police Department (TR-55). The officers
searched the vehicle (TR-56). They found a wooden box with a counterweight
scale with white residue and baggies underneath the scale (TR-59). They found a
snort tube (TR- 60) and 31-32 grams of Methamphetamme (TR-100).
Counsel for Ms. Althoff filed a Request for Discovery on October 1st, 2002
(R-15). Prior to trial on January 14th, 2003 the State presented counsel with a
written list of its witnesses (R-28). The list enumerated four witnesses. Two,
Tiffany Berardi and Kevin Smith were identified as "expert." The remaining two,
Kent Adair and Jim Eberling were identified as "Law enforcement, assisting
officer in the case" and "Law enforcement, arresting officer" respectively.
At trial, Officer Eberling indicated he was not aware of a saleable amount
of methamphetamme (TR-64). However, Officer Adair did testify as to what
quantities would be indicative of distribution rather that personal consumption
(TR-90).

Nothing in the discovery response or Adair's testimony about his

training or experience (TR-82-83) accounts for how he obtained this knowledge.
Although the record is initially unclear as to whether there was a timely objection
7

to Adair's testimony or distribution quantities, it does indicate a sidebar request by
Ms. Althoff s Counsel (TR-90). This sidebar, and the objection are clarified by
Judge Anderson at page 104, et seq. of the transcript, after the jury was excused.
At that point counsel restates that his objection to Officer Adair testifying
to distribution is based both on Rule 16 and Section 77-17-13 (TR-105-6).
Judge Anderson clarifies that Adair was allowed to testify as a lay witness
pursuant to Rule 701 URE (TR-105).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in overruling objections by defense counsel to Officer
Adair's testimony regarding the amount of methamphetamine in a single dose and
the amounts which show possession with intent to distribute. He was not an
expert on such matters. Defendant was not given notice of the State's intent to use
Officer Adair for such purposes pursuant to either a valid discovery request or
Section 77-17-13-(l)(a) U.C.A. without inadmissible testimony on these matters
the State could not have carried its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
ARGUMENT
Point I:
Officer Adair should not have been allowed to
testify about Distribution of Methamphetamine.

Ms. Althoff s position is twofold. Either Adair's testimony was violative
of her discovery or statutory rights or Adair is not an expert and should not have
been allowed to give testimony about distribution.
8

"The State has two independent obligations to provide evidence to the
defense. First, the State has a duty under the Due Process Clause of the United
Constitution to provide, without request by the Defendant all exculpatory
evidence. Second, when required by court order, the State must disclose evidence
pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." State v. Kallin,
877 P. 2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994), cited in State v. Rugebregt, 965 P. 2d 518, 522
(Utah App 1998).
The evidence given by Adair was inculpatory. As such, the prosecutors'
discovery duty, whether under Court order or on request, was to comply fully and
forthright. Kallin, at 143; Rugebregt, at 522.
There are two operative consideration in the instant case. The first is
Defendant's timely discovery request (R-15). The second is the prosecutor's
voluntary submission of his witness list designating Adair as "Law enforcement,
assisting officer."

(R-28). The Prosecutor did not disclose Adair's intended

testimony about distribution. This is violative of the requirement set forth by the
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913, 916-17 (Utah 1987), that
the prosecutor must identify all relevant material or identify the portion not
disclosed.
This case is analogous to State v. Perez, 52 P 3d 451 (UT App 2002). In
Perez the State made a voluntary disclosure of some inculpatory evidence. It did
not, however, reveal that it would call another officer and establish him as an
expert on fingerprint analysis or the time frame of when prints were placed.
9

Although the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion under Rule 16 by admitting the testimony, it did so only because it
found that Perez waived his right to later claim error by failing to request
continuance or seek other appropriate relief under Rule 16. Perez, at 458, citing
Rugebregt, supra, and State v. Larson, 775 P. 2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989).
Unlike Perez, in which the appellate court found the first objection only
during redirect examination, Id, at 458, Althoff made a timely objection at the
beginning of Adair's purported expert testimony (TR-90; 104). Perez, "Waived
relief under Rule 16 (g)

by not making timely efforts to mitigate or eliminate

the prejudice caused by the prosecutor's conduct." Id, at 458, citing State v.
Griffiths, 752 P. 2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988).
It is not Althoff s burden to show prejudice arising from the State's failure
to disclose Adair's testimony. In State v. Arellano, 964 P 2d 1167, 1170 (Utah
App 1998), recognizing the difficult burden placed on Defendant's to establish
prejudice shifted to burden or proving prejudice from the Defendant to the State.
"Therefore, to establish that the prosecution's error was not
prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that there is no
reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecution's error, the
outcome would have been more favorable for defendant." Id
"Therefore, if any party should suffer from the uncertainty, it
should be the party at fault. As such, we give defendant's
explanation of prejudice
the benefit of the doubt." Id.
Cited in State v. Tolano, 19 P 3d 400 (Utah App 2001),
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Although the Tolano, case cited above, makes a 77-17-13 analysis, its
rationale applies at present. Indeed, the fact situation of Tolano is remarkably
similar to this case.
At Tolano's preliminary hearing, the State presented a
toxicology report prepared by two criminologists from the Utah
State Crime Laboratory. The report was signed by both
criminologists, and it established that the white powder in the two
packages was cocaine. Tolano was allowed to look at the report but
the State did not provide him with a copy of the report or any other
information regarding the criminologists. During Tolanofs trial, the
State called the two criminologists as expert witnesses to identify
the white powder found in the two packages. After the testimony of
these two experts, Tolano moved to strike their testimony. In the
alternative, Tolano moved for a continuance pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 77-17- 13(4)(a) (1999). Tolano noted that section 77-17-13
requires the State to provide him with the names, addresses,
resumes, and re- ports of any proposed expert witnesses. Tolano
argued that the State did not fulfill these notice requirements for
expert wit- nesses because the State merely showed him a report
containing the names of the two criminologists. Tolano reasoned
that because the State failed to meet the notice requirements of
section 77-17-13, the trial court should strike their testimony or, in
the alternative, grant him a continuance.

In Tolano the lower court held the Defendant should have anticipated
expert testimony. The appellate court, for the reasons stated above, rejected that
argument.
In the alternative, Althoff urges that Adair was not an expert and that his
testimony was inappropriate. Evidence on the significance of the amount of drug
possessed is specialized and not within the possession of the typical jurors
knowledge, thereby requiring the jurors with the knowledge necessary to the
understanding. U.S. v. Muldrow, 19 F. 3d 1332, 1338 (C.A. 10 (KAN), 1994).
11

The trial court clearly stated Adair was a lay, not an expert witness, based
probably on an inadequate foundation to qualify as an expert (TR-105). As such,
Adair was incapable of giving the opinions testimony necessary to provide the
jurors the necessary knowledge to find possession with intent to distribute.
CONCLUSION
The States failure to provide notice that they intended to call Officer Adair
as an expert violated Althoff s right to a fair trial under statutory and evidentiary
requirements.
The failure to provide competent expert testimony precludes a conviction
for possession with intent to distribute.
DATED this 19th day of August 2003.

WILLIAM<trSCHUl/rZ
Attorney forAppellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the foregoing
Opening Brief of Appellant to Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, 160 E. 300
South, Heber Wells Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this 20th
day of August 2003.

William L. Schul
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ADDENDUM

Copy of April 8 2003, Judgment and Order of Commitment to Utah State Prison.

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

FILED

APR " 8
CLERK OF THE COURT

^ t ,

BY
DEPUTY

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
PO Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone: (435) 587-2128
Fax: (435) 587-3119
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT TO
UTAH STATE PRISON

Plaintiff,
vs.
TONYA ALTHOFF,

Case No. 0217-82

Defendant.
APRIL 7, 2003
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON
Plaintiff Attorney:

Craig C. Halls

Defendant Attorney:

William L. Schultz

This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing judgment
in this case, and the defendant being present in Court and
represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore been
found guilty by a jury to the offenses of:
COUNT 1: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree Felony; COUNT 2:

DRIVING UNDER THE

INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a Class B Misdemeanor; COUNT
3:

POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor;

COUNT 4: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED OPERATOR'S LICENSE, a

Class B Misdemeanor; and COUNT St FAILURE BY NSW OWNER T O SBCURB
WBW REGISTRATION AND W W CERTIFICATE OP T3TM, a Claas C

Mxsdemeanor; and the defendant stating to thn r.nurt that f-h^rft la
no legal reason shown why judgment of this court should not be
pronounced, it is the judgment of this court as follows:
That you, Tanya Althoff, be imprisoned in the Utah State
Prison for a terra of ONE TO FIFTEEN YEARS on Count One; SIX
MONTHS in Lhe San Juan County J^il each on Counte 2, 3, and 4,
and NTNF.TY r>AVS an fhitih 5, to bft served aoncurrently. Defendant
is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $92S.oo and
restitution to the Public Defender's Fund in the amount of
$250.00.
TANYA A L T H O K F is hereby ordered remanded to the custody of
the Ban Juan County Sheriff or other proper offie* for transfer
to the custody of the Utah state Prison to serve her sentence,
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